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SEE Journal government choose to borrow and accumulate debt? First, debt may be used to fund spending that contributes to broader economic and social objectives such as physical infrastructure, population's education and health. Second, debt may be used as a buffer to limit the need to immediately raise taxes to finance increased spending in the view of a sudden and temporary event, for example, a war or a natural disaster (see Barro 1979) . Third, financing counter-cyclical fiscal policy by issuing debt helps to stabilise the economy and smooth the business cycle. However, high public debt requires high taxes to repay the debt and pushes upward the real interest rates, crowding out private investment. A highly indebted government that it is no longer able to finance its deficits should raise taxes or curtail spending often at a time when fiscal policy is needed to help stabilise the economy. In other words, fiscal policy becomes procyclical instead of being counter-cyclical. When the government cannot find revenues to finance debt issue, a debt crisis occurs and the government is forced to default or inflate the debt away. Both actions entail large economic and social costs due to resulting painful periods of financial consolidation and economic adjustment.
In this paper, we study the country specific features that determine a sovereign risk element. We place an emphasis on the SEE countries' fiscal structure in a comparative perspective, since public debt has often had more immediate consequences for economic performance and debt crisis has been a recurring phenomenon in the histories of many of these countries.
Country risk includes 'sovereign risk', i.e. the risk that a government would fail to honour its sovereign obligations due to either unwillingness or inability to pay; 'transfer risk', i.e. the risk of restrictions on the international transfer of funds; and 'collective debtor risk', i.e. the threat country-wide events will cause simultaneously default by a large number of private debtors.
1 Country risk is high when currency mismatch is high; the real exchange rate is overvalued; and large portfolio capital inflows paired with a weak banking system make it less likely that credit expansion will go towards the most efficient borrowers (Goldstein 2007) . Analytically, when financial liabilities are mostly denominated in domestic currency while assets are mainly denominated in foreign currency, then depreciation of the local currency will result in balance sheet problems that cause economic growth to decline. Thus, a low rate of GDP growth drives government revenues lower and threatens the country's ability to service its liabilities since the less liquid a country the more likely a debt crisis. Moreover, and more importantly, a high probability of a 'sovereign risk event' implies deterioration in the governance balance sheet that will eventually adversely affect the health of the balance sheet of both households and firms and ultimately the health of the balance sheet of the banks. This happens because an increase in the debt ratio today implies that taxes will go up tomorrow, impairing firms' profitability and reducing their ability to repay their debts to the banks.
We analyse SEE public debt dynamics in a comparative perspective and assess debt sustainability by first comparing actual and debt stabilising primary balances and, second, by looking at the relationship between fiscal policy tools and objectives. We find that although all SEE countries in our sample have made efforts towards successful fiscal consolidation, the data, however, have shown that it was largely supported by strong growth rates and low real interest rates over the last few years. More importantly, the empirical evidence is suggestive of a weak link between public debt sustainability and the short-run conduct of fiscal policy.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses SEE public debt dynamics over the last decade. Section 3 nominates the specific features of the fiscal structure in SEE countries that determine the level of public debt that they can sustain. Section 4 estimates the fiscal policy response of debt accumulation. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Public Debt Dynamics in SEE
To the best of our knowledge, few studies have empirically examined public debt sustainability or large public debt reductions in emerging market economies. More recently, Rogoff (2009, 2010) analyse the cycles underlying serial debt and banking crises across a large sample of both emerging and mature economies and over a long time span.
2 In this section, we study those country specific features that determine a .
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Fiscal Policy Stance and Debt Sustainability in SEE countries: A Comparative Analysis 'sovereign risk event'. We place an emphasis upon the countries' fiscal structures in a comparative perspective. Public debt had sharply increased since the mid-1990s in many transition economies with costly debt defaults (Russia, Ukraine) and severe fiscal difficulties (Turkey) in the very early years of the 2000s. However, this is not to say that there have not been success stories. For example, Bulgaria has succeeded reducing significantly its excessively high public debt ratio, from close to 160 per cent of GDP in the early 1990s to less than 20 per cent in 2007. Another success story is Serbia; its high public debt has been reduced from around 240 per cent of GDP in 2000 to close to 30% in 2007. 3 As seen in Figure 1 , after a peak in 2000, total public debt as per cent of GDP followed a downward trend during the period 1998-2008, largely as the result of the painful fiscal consolidation process pursued over the last years. Compared with the value that the ratio takes for the euro area over the same period (70%), we see that for the SEE countries the mean rate was 1.5 times lower (Figure 2 ). Debt as a percentage of total public revenues is also lower in SEE (see Figure 3) . However, Albania and Turkey have higher ratios; they are more than 2.5 times higher. Moreover, as seen in Figure 4 , external debt was 2 times as high as internal debt, with Serbia, Bulgaria and FYROM show a higher proportion of external to internal debt.
Notes: gross debt of general government, simple unweighted country averages, end of period data. For Turkey, the data refer to the nonfinancial public sector, and for FYROM, to consolidated central government. The data entries for the years 2007 and 2008 are preliminary, projected or estimated. The time period for Serbia (Montenegro is excluded) is 2000 -2008 for Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1999 -2008 . See also the data appendix. Sources: IMF Country Reports, SDW ECB, AMECO General Government Data (spring 2009) and national central banks. , 8 countries, 1998-2008 What are the main explanations behind the developments in SEE markets' public debt? Figure 5 highlights the changes in the debt stock by using a simple public debt dynamics equation using the 2008 data entries. In particular, it gives a quantitative expression of the debt dynamics, giving the influence of the flow variables on the evolution of the outstanding stock of government debt. GDP, 1998 GDP, -2008 According to the debt dynamics or the budgetary constraint of a country, public debt changes are influenced by the primary fiscal deficit (non-interest expenditures less revenues), the nominal GDP growth rate and interest rate and 'other factors'. The last item captures a wide range of factors, including the accumulation of financial assets, exchange rate depreciations, and fiscal costs arising from the resolution of banking sector crises and receipts from privatization deals (off-balance sheet items, contingent liabilities as well as remaining statistical adjustments). 4 It is known as stock-flow adjustment or debt-deficit adjustment (SFA). It ensures the consistency between a flow variable such as net borrowing and the variation in the stock of gross debt. Analytically, SFA is made up of the following elements. First, the net acquisition of financial assets leads to changes of the stock of debt even though it does not contribute to the primary deficit. Second, the appreciation or the depreciation of foreign currency denominated debt reflects the impact of changes in exchange rates on these debt components that are denominated in foreign currencies. Third, corrections are also needed due to the fact that the debt is measured at face value and therefore accrued interest is excluded. Fourth, adjustment may arise due to changes in sector classification and volume changes in financial liabilities. The last element of SFA is the statistical discrepancy that reflects differences arising from the diversity of data sources and statistical practices. , average, 1998-2008 We note that in almost all of the countries in the sample, with the exemption of Turkey, the impact of output growth and the interest rate was favourable in reducing the stock of debt. The contribution of the primary balance, however, was not strong enough so as to cut debt. This was true in particular for Turkey, but not for Bulgaria. The broad picture is that the primary government balances were often insufficient to significantly reduce the debt-to-GDP-ratio. Primary deficits in Albania, Croatia, Serbia and Romania either constrained the downward trend of debt or reinforced its upward movement. In Turkey, in particular, the contribution of the primary surplus, even though it was large in value, did not seem strong so as to eventually contain debt. With regard to the 'other factors', in only two cases, Albania and FYROM, do they seem to have contributed to debt fall. In all of the other cases, their contribution was positive and particularly strong in Bosnia-Herzegovina 5 , Bulgaria and Turkey. Additionally, finding empirical evidence of the 'twin deficits' relation in SEE countries during the transition process has proven elusive, since many factors other than fiscal policy play a significant role in determining the current account (IMF 2008) . Panel data estimates for 15 Eastern and Southeastern European countries over the period [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] reveal that the current account is likely to be driven by more factors than fiscal variables, such as domestic credit, economic activity, terms of trade and the real effective exchange rate that have a significant impact on the current account (see Bartolini and Lahiri 2006) . The received mixed empirical evidence may reflect first strong Ricardian effects, namely where fiscal consolidation allows economic agents to reduce domestic savings and, second, the overwhelming effect of domestic investment in causing large and persistent current account deficits (Teferra and Mottu 2006) . 5 Till 2006, the country's total public debt was dominated in foreign currencies and in conjunction with the strong devaluation pressures against the dollar, stock flow adjustment was high. 
(2).
Based on equation 2, the total change in the gross debt ratio has been assessed as the contribution of primary balance (Pt, deficit), the stock flow adjustment and the contribution of nominal output growth and the nominal interest rate. The implicit interest rate it is derived as the nominal interest expenditure divided by previous period debt stock. For the most countries in the sample, data entries for the year 2008 are preliminary, estimates or projections. Source: Own calculations based on data from IMF Country Reports. 
Assessing debt sustainability
What are the specific features of the fiscal structure in SEE countries that determine the level of public debt that they can sustain? We can nominate the following: (i) SEE countries generally have lower and more volatile revenue ratios (see Figure 6 ). On average, the revenue to GDP ratio is about 33 per cent for the period 1998-2008, compared with 45 per cent in the euro area during the same period. There are, however, considerable differences among the countries with, for example, Serbia and BosniaHerzegovina having ratios almost on par with the euro area. 6 On the other hand, Turkey, Albania and FYROM are the countries with the lowest revenue 6 It may be more important to assess the effective direct and indirect tax rate in an attempt to detect the reasons of the observed low revenue ratios. However, lack of data on key variables for many countries in the sample does not allow us to carry out this task. According to the methodology proposed by Mendoza, Razin and Tezar (1994) , the effective direct tax rate is calculated as the ratio of total tax and non-tax revenues net of domestic taxes on goods and services divided by the sum of compensation of employees and total operating surplus. The effective indirect tax rate is calculated as the ratio of all domestic taxes on goods and services divided by private consumption.
ratio. The volatility of revenues measured as the coefficient of variation in SEE countries is generally much higher than in the euro area. Volatility is four times as high as in the euro area. , 1998-2008 (ii) Interest costs account for a high proportion of government expenditure in SEE countries (see Figures 7.1 and 7.2). At 11 per cent of total expenditure, interest costs are 1.5 times as high in SEE countries as in the euro area, even though they account for an average of 3.5 per cent of GDP, which is on par with the EA-16. The relatively large burden of the interest cost indicates the risks to which SEE counties are exposed in view of the current worldwide financial and economic turbulence. This is because a decline in the growth rate accompanied by an upward move in expenditures and a downward move in revenues make the management of a short maturity debt a very hard task. Interest expenditures are also more volatile because of the structure of public debt. As seen in Figure 7 .2, the coefficient of variation is 2.5 times as high in SEE countries as in the euro area. Currency mismatches and maturity mismatches can explain to 7 It has been empirically shown (see IMF 2003, Kose, Prasad and Terroner 2003) that, for most of the emerging economies, the impact of commodity prices and commodity exports on government revenues and thus on primary budget balance is important even for the emerging market economies that have diversified their exports away from primary commodities. , 1998-2008 8 For all countries, foreign currency denominated debt accounts for a very large proportion of total public debt. For example, in Bulgaria, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and FYROM the stock of debt that is denominated in foreign currencies accounts for more than two thirds of the total stock. 
Actual and debt stabilising primary balances
These differences in public debt structures may have important implications for debt sustainability. A quite simple approach to public debt sustainability starts from the basic accounting identity that links the public sector budget balance to the change in the debt stock. A fiscal policy can be viewed as sustainable if it delivers a ratio of public debt to GDP that is stable. The difference between the actual and the debt stabilizing primary balance indicates the degree of fiscal adjustment that is needed to achieve a constant debt to GDP ratio (see Blanchard at al. 1990) .
The budget identity indicates that the stock of public debt at the beginning of period t+1 (B t+1 ) results from the inherited debt (B t ) to which the period t interest requirements are added. Since interest costs are not a fiscal policy variable but depend on the stock of debt, the identity can be re-written relating the primary (non interest) balance, P t (surplus), to the change of public debt stock:
B t+1 = (1+r t ) B t -P t (1) or in terms of ratios to GDP to account for the effect of growth on borrowing capacity 
) where g and r can be also measured in real terms as the effect of inflation disappears with the use of GDP ratios. From equation (3), the primary surplus consistent with a constant debt to GDP ratio increases with the initial debt stock and the difference between the real interest rate and the real growth rate, insofar that the real interest rate is higher than real growth. The main drawback of this simple indicator of debt sustainability is that it is based upon an arbitrary definition of sustainability (i.e. to stabilize the debt to GDP ratio). This is because it is unlikely for a country to maintain a stable debt ratio at all times while incurring temporally high debt levels that may be appropriate in some circumstances (see IMF 2003) .
If the actual primary balance is less than the debt stabilising balance, current fiscal policy implies an increasing ratio of public debt to GDP. Based on the historical averages for the years 2005-2007, one can conclude that most countries in the sample had run primary (non-interest) balances consistent with what was required to stabilise or reduce the debt to the GDP ratio (see Figure 8) . In all cases, public debt was below 60 per cent of GDP, i.e. the benchmark established for the EU members in the Maastricht Treaty. In Serbia and Turkey, both countries with a high debt ratio, the actual primary balance was more than the debt stabilising balance, meaning that fiscal policy pursued over the past few years implied a decreasing ratio of public debt to GDP and, therefore, it was viewed as sustainable. The reverse, however, is true for Romania and even Albania. 9 Many factors might explain the favourable prospects for SEE government debt dynamics. All countries had recently made considerable efforts to increase their primary fiscal surpluses. Further, a smaller primary surplus would be needed to stabilise or reduce the debt ratio as real growth was stronger and the real interest rate was much lower in the past few years.
9 Romania had the lowest debt ratio, but its actual primary balance was less than the debt stabilizing balance. Albania had the highest debt ratio among all of the countries in the sample while the difference between its actual primary balance and debt stabilising balance was near zero.
Notes: real interest rate= nominal rate on public debt minus change in GDP deflator. See also the data appendix. Source: Own calculations (see eq. 3) based on data from IMF Country Reports. 
Fiscal Policy Response to Debt Accumulation
A more formal approach to assessing debt sustainability is to look at the relationship between the fiscal policy tools and objectives. In other words, we estimate the 'fiscal policy rule' or the 'fiscal policy reaction function'. 10 In the context of the fiscal policy decision making process, we consider primary fiscal surplus as the key operating target that reflects the actions of the fiscal authorities and maintaining debt sustainability as their primary objectives. Therefore, we assume that primary fiscal surplus responds to public debt changes.
Following Bohn (1998) , the fiscal policy reaction function can be written as follows
where p it is the primary surplus of country i at period t , X ijt is a vector of temporary factors (j=1..N), b it-1 is the debt level at the end of the previous period, a i is the country specific constant (fixed effect) account for heterogeneity in the group of the countries in the sample and u it is an error term.
10 For fiscal policy studies for industrial countries see, Bohn (1998) , Mélitz (1997) , Debrun and Wyplosz (1999) and Gali and Perroti (2003) . 
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A short-run consistent borrowing schedule requires that the primary balance systematically and positively responds to past changes in the public debt, that is the parameter λ in equation (4) takes a positive value. Specifically, we refer to the association between the primary surplus as per cent of GDP and the ratio of public debt to GDP observed at the end of the preceding year. For assessing this connection, we used pooled data for 8 SEE countries over the period 2000-2008. However, surpluses are also affected by other macroeconomic variables that explain changes in primary balances unrelated to debt sustainability. According to Barro's tax smoothing policy (1979) these variables reflect temporary shocks to government spending that are due to business cycle fluctuations or exceptional events (such as wartime emergencies, natural disasters or economic crises and financial panics) that increase spending to abnormal levels. Therefore, apart from the ratio of public debt to GDP we consider two temporary factors that affect the primary balance: the business cycle and the inflation rate. Specifically, the output gap defined as the deviation of real GDP from its H-P filtered trend is included to capture the impact of the business cycle on the primary surplus. The CPI inflation rate accounts for shocks to seigniorage revenues. Figure 9 brings together the primary balance 11 and public debt. As seen, the link between them seems to be positive at almost any level of debt below 50 per cent of GDP. However, the response of the primary surplus weakens and turns to be negative as the debt to GDP ratio exceeds that level and it stops altogether when the debt ratio exceeds 60 per cent of GDP. We should mention that this behaviour rests on the average of the countries in the sample and it does not refer to each individual country.
11 Not adjusted for the influence of transitory changes.
Note:
The Kernel is the function used to weight the observations in each local regression; mean averages, end-of-year data. The empirical results presented in Table 1 verify the conclusion above. Before proceeding, we first take into account the time series properties of our data set. Testing the series for the presence of a unit root is necessary to avoid a spurious correlation. On the basis of the ADF test, we find that the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at conventional significance levels.
Debt stationarity does not necessarily mean debt sustainability. In a deterministic world, '…debt is said to be sustainable when the present value of future revenue flows minus debtor expenses can pay for all that has been contractually agreed' (Lustasa da Costa 2010, p74). One of the most commonly used ways to assess sustainability is based on public debt stationary tests. This way has gained momentum from the work of Hamilton and Flavin (1986) . We recall that a stochastic process is in general stationary when it tends to revert to its average or to its trend following a random shock. Alternatively, a series is said to be weakly or convariance stationary if the mean and autocovariance of the series do not depend on time. This simply means that following a shock that changes the value of the debt, surpluses are raised to force the debt to slowly return to its original value. In other words, the value of the debt complies with the transversallity condition that says that the debt should be sustainable. However, Bohn (2007) questions this literature. He claims that an integrated debt of any order is always stationary. A difference stationary series is said to be integrated; the order of integration is the number of unit roots contained 
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Fiscal Policy Stance and Debt Sustainability in SEE countries: A Comparative Analysis in the series, i.e. the number of differencing operations it takes to make the series stationary. However, in practice we cannot reject sustainability based on stationary tests since stationarity cannot be tested for all orders. Ultimately, we cannot prove that a debt series is nonsustainable. Besides, stationarity tests based on the historical evolution of the observed time series neglect very recent structural changes that alter the future behaviour of the series. Estimating the fiscal policy reaction function and taking into account the influence of temporary factors and the existence of a non-linear relationship (quadratic and cubic powers of public debt have been added in the regression equation) between the primary surplus and public debt (both as per cent of GDP), we find that at low levels of debt the primary surplus does respond positively although slightly to a rise of the debt to GDP ratio. At mid levels, this response weakens and turns to a negative sign while at higher levels it seems that the primary surplus does not react at all as debt rises. It is worth noting that both transitory factors of the fiscal policy have the expected signs, but only inflation is statistically Notes: pooled cross section and time series data. The equations have been estimated with GLS allowing for fixed effects (country and period) and using a heteroskedasticity-consistent White variance-covariance matrix. se is the standard error of the regression. A constant term is automatically included so that the fixed effects estimates sum to zero. They should be interpreted as deviations from an overall mean. A Hausman (1978 , Davidson and Mackinnon 1989 specification test has been also carried out testing whether the estimates are consistent. Debt service payments are chosen as an instrument in the auxiliary regression. The p-values of rejecting the hypothesis of consistent estimates are reported in the parentheses. (*) significant at 1%, (**) significant at 5%, (***) significant at 10%. See also the data appendix. 
Data Appendix
In the empirical analysis we choose a set of macroeconomic variables for which a continuous data series is available for all of the countries in the sample. However, the use of different data sources and frequent updates concerning the variables' definitions or the method of data evaluation raise the problem of the existence of significant statistical discrepancies.
The data set for public debt (see Section 5) focuses on gross public sector debt rather than on net debt (where public sector assets are netted out) or the present value of the debt because of data limitations. The data are on a general government basis.
The set of fiscal variables refers to EA-16. Debt: outstanding, general government; total public revenue: total current revenue (i.e. total of current taxes, social security contributions and other current revenue received by the general government, capital transfers are not included, ESA 95) (SDW ECB, AMECO); interest includes flows on swaps and forward rate agreements, excessive deficit procedure (AMECO General Government Data, spring 2009).
Romania. Debt: consolidated general government, excluding public debt guarantees (SDW ECB, AMECO and Romanian National Bank); interest, total government expenditure: consolidated general government (IMF Country Reports).
Bulgaria. Debt: general government, total public revenue: general govern ment (taxes, grants and non tax revenues) (IMF Country Reports); interest and total government expenditure: excluding social insurance contributions paid by the general government on behalf of its employees (IMF Country Reports).
Croatia. Debt: general government, arrears and guarantees stock are excluded; total revenue: consolidated central government (IMF Country Reports, Croatian National Bank); interest and total government expenditure: consolidated general government (Ministry of Finance). 
